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1Monitoring and Early Detection
for Internet Worms
Cliff C. Zou, Weibo Gong, Don Towsley, Lixin Gao
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
{czou, gong, lgao}@ecs.umass.edu, towsley@cs.umass.edu
Abstract— After several Internet-scale worm incidents
in recent years, it is clear that a simple self-propagating
worm can quickly spread across the Internet and cause
severe damage to our society. Facing this great security
threat, we must build an early detection system to detect
the presence of a worm as quickly as possible in order to
give people enough time for counteractions. In this paper,
we first present an Internet worm monitoring system. Then
based on the idea of “detecting the trend, not the burst” of
monitored illegitimate traffic, we present a non-threshold
based “trend detection” methodology to detect a worm
at its early stage by using Kalman filter estimation. In
addition, for uniform scan worms such as Code Red and
Slammer, we can effectively predict the overall vulnerable
population size, and estimate accurately how many com-
puters are really infected in the global Internet based on
the biased monitored data. For monitoring of non-uniform
scan worms such as Blaster, we show that the address space
covered by a monitoring system should be as distributed
as possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Morris worm in 1988 [21], the secu-
rity threat posed by worms has steadily increased,
especially in the last several years. In 2001, Code
Red and Nimda infected hundreds of thousands
of computers [17][4], causing millions of dollars
loss to our society [27]. The SQL Slammer worm
appeared on January 25th, 2003, and infected more
than 90% of vulnerable computers in the Internet
within 10 minutes [19]. On August 11th, 2003,
Blaster hit us again and infected around 330,000
to one million computers within several days [26].
Currently, some organizations and security com-
panies, such as the CERT, CAIDA, and SANS
Institute [3][5][22], are monitoring the Internet and
paying close attention to any abnormal traffic. When
they observe abnormal network activities, their se-
curity experts will immediately analyze these inci-
dents. However, until now no nation-scale malware
monitoring and defense center exists. Given the fast
spreading nature of Internet worms and their severe
damage to our society, it is necessary to setup a
nation-scale worm monitoring and early warning
system.
In order to detect an unknown (zero-day) worm,
a straightforward way is to use various threshold-
based anomaly detection methods. We can directly
use some well-studied methods established in the
anomaly intrusion detection area. However, many
threshold-based anomaly detections have the trou-
ble in dealing with their high false alarm rate.
In this paper, we do not try to propose another
threshold-based anomaly detection method. Instead,
we present a non-threshold based detection method-
ology, “trend detection”, by using the principle
“detecting monitored traffic trend, not burst” [30].
Traditional threshold-based anomaly detection
methods try to detect a worm by detecting either
the long-term or the short-term burst of monitored
traffic. However, the monitored data contains noisy
background traffic that is caused by many other
factors besides the worm we want to detect, such
as some old worms’ scans or hackers’ port scans.
Thus traditional threshold-based detections usually
will generate excessive false alarms. In the case of
worm detection, we find that we can take advantage
of the difference between a worm’s propagation and
a hacker’s intrusion attack: a worm code exhibits
simple attack behaviors and its propagation usually
follows some dynamic models because of its large-
scale infection; on the other hand, a hacker’s in-
trusion attack, which is more complicated, usually
targets one or a set of specific computers and does
not follow any well-defined dynamic model in most
cases.
Therefore, our “trend detection” system attempts
to detect the dynamic trend of monitored traffic
2based on the fact that at the early stage a worm
propagates exponentially with a constant, positive
exponential rate — the “trend” we try to detect is
the exponential growth trend of monitored traffic.
Based on worm propagation dynamic models,
we detect the propagation of a worm in its early
stage by using Kalman filter estimation algorithms.
The Kalman filter is activated when the monitor-
ing system encounters a surge of illegitimate scan
activities. If the infection rate estimated by the
Kalman filter, which is also the exponential growth
rate of a worm’s propagation at its early stage,
stabilizes and oscillates slightly around a constant
positive value, we claim that the illegitimate scan
activities are mainly caused by a worm, even if
the estimated worm infection rate is still not well
converged. If the monitored traffic is caused by non-
worm noise, the traffic will not have the exponential
growth trend, then the estimated value of infection
rate would oscillate around zero. In other words,
the Kalman filter is used to detect the presence of
a worm by detecting the trend, not the burst, of
the observed illegitimate traffic. In this way, the
unpredictable, noisy illegitimate traffic we observe
everyday will not cause too many false alarms to
our detection system — such background noise will
cause great trouble to traditional threshold-based
detection methods.
In addition, we present a formula to predict a
worm’s vulnerable population size. We also present
a formula to correct the bias in the number of
infected hosts observed by a monitoring system—
this bias has been mentioned in [6] and [20], but
neither of them has presented methods to correct
it. Furthermore, we point out that in designing a
worm monitoring system, the address space covered
by a monitoring system should be as distributed as
possible in order to monitor and detect non-uniform
scan worms, especially a sequential scan worm such
as Blaster.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II surveys related work. In Section III, we
introduces worm propagation models used in this
paper. Section IV describes briefly the monitoring
system for early detection of worms. Then we dis-
cuss data collection and provide the bias correction
formula for monitored biased data in Section V.
In Section VI, we present Kalman filters for early
worm detection, and the formula to predict the
vulnerable population size. We conduct extensive
simulation experiments and show the major results
in Section VII. In Section VIII, we discuss some
possible future works. In the end, Section IX con-
cludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, people have paid attention to the
necessity of monitoring the Internet for malicious
activities. Moore presented the concept of “network
telescope”, in analogy to light telescope, by using
a small fraction of IP space to observe security
incidents in the global Internet [20]. Yegneswaran et
al. pointed out that there was no obvious addressing
biases when using the “network telescope” moni-
toring methodology [28]. “Honeynet” is a network
of honeypots to gather comprehensive information
of attacks [11]. Symantec Corp. has an “enterprise
early warning solution”, which collects IDS and
firewall attack data from the security systems of
thousands of partners to keep track of the latest
attack incidents [25]. The SANS Institute set up the
“Internet Storm Center” in November 2000, which
could gather the log data from participants’ intrusion
detection sensors distributed around the world [15].
It has quickly expanded to gather more than three
million intrusion detection log entries every day.
Berk et al. proposed a monitoring system by col-
lecting ICMP “Destination Unreachable” messages
generated by routers for packets to non-existent IP
addresses [2]. Based on such a monitoring system,
they presented a threshold-based detection system
called TRAFFEN.
The monitoring system we present in this paper
can be incorporated into the current monitoring
systems such as the SANS “Internet Storm Center”.
Our contribution in this context is to point out the
infrastructure specifically for worm monitoring, and
what data should be collected for early detection
of worms. We also emphasize the functionality
of egress monitors, which has been overlooked in
previous research. Worm monitors can be ingress
or egress filters on routers, which cover more IP
space and gather more comprehensive information
than the log data collected from intrusion detection
sensors or firewalls for current monitoring systems.
In the area of virus and worm modelling, Kephart,
White and Chess of IBM performed a series of
studies from 1991 to 1993 on viral infection based
3on epidemiology models [12][13][14]. Staniford et
al. [23] used the classical epidemic model to model
the spread of Code Red right after the Code Red in-
cident on July 19th, 2001. Their model matches well
the increasing part of the observation data of Code
Red. Zou et al. [29] presented a “two-factor” worm
model that considered both the effect of human
countermeasures and the effect of the congestion
caused by extensive worm scan traffic. Chen et al.
[6] presented a discrete-time version worm model
that considered the patching and cleaning effect
during a worm’s propagation.
For a fast spreading worm such as Slammer, it is
necessary to have automatic response and mitigation
mechanisms. Moore et al. [18] discussed the effect
of Internet quarantine for containing worm propaga-
tion. Zou et al. [33] presented a feedback dynamic
quarantine system for automatic mitigation by bor-
rowing two principles used in the epidemic disease
control in the real world: “preemptive quarantine”
and “feedback adjustment”. However, both papers
did not discuss how to detect a worm in its early
stage. Staniford [24] presented worm quarantine
for enterprise networks by using “CounterMalice”
devices to separate an enterprise network into many
isolated subnetworks. However, the device is used
to detect a worm when some computers inside an
enterprise network are infected, at which time the
worm may have already infected most vulnerable
computers in the Internet.
We assume that the IP infrastructure is the current
IPv4. If IPv6 replaces IPv4, the 2128 IP space of the
IPv6 would make it futile for a worm to propagate
through blindly IP scans [31]. However, we believe
IPv6 will not replace IPv4 in the near future, and
worms will continue to use various random scan
techniques to spread in the Internet.
III. WORM PROPAGATION MODEL
A promising approach for modelling and evalu-
ating the behavior of malware is the use of fluid
models. Fluid models are appropriate for a system
that consists of a large number of vulnerable hosts.
The simple epidemic model assumes that each host
resides in one of two states: susceptible or infected.
The model further assumes that, once infected by
a virus or a worm, a host remains in the infectious
state forever. Thus any host has only one possible
state transition: susceptible → infected [7]. The
simple epidemic model for a finite population is
dIt
dt
= βIt[N − It] (1)
where It is the number of infected hosts at time
t; N is the size of population; and β is called the
pairwise rate of infection in epidemic studies [7].
At t = 0, I0 hosts are infected while the remaining
N − I0 hosts are susceptible.
This model captures the basic mechanism of a
worm’s propagation, especially for the initial stage
of a worm’s propagation when the effect of human
counteractions and network congestion is ignorable
[29].
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Fig. 1. Worm propagation model
For the epidemic model (1), Fig. 1 shows the
dynamics of It as time goes on for one set of
parameters. We can roughly partition a worm’s
propagation into three phases: the slow start phase,
the fast spread phase, and the slow finish phase.
During the slow start phase, since It  N , the
number of infected hosts increases exponentially
(model (1) becomes dIt/dt ≈ βNIt). After many
hosts are infected and then participate in infecting
others, the worm enters the fast spread phase where
vulnerable hosts are infected at a fast, near linear
speed. When most of vulnerable computers have
been infected, the worm enters the slow finish phase
because the few leftover vulnerable computers are
difficult for the worm to search out. Our task is to
detect the presence of a worm in its slow start phase
as early as possible.
At the early stage of a worm’s propagation, N −
It ≈ N . Since we want to detect a worm at its
slow start phase, we can accurately model a worm’s
propagation at this stage by using the exponential
growth model:
dIt
dt
= βNIt (2)
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NOTATIONS IN THIS PAPER
Notation Definition
N Number of hosts under consideration
∆ The length of monitoring interval (time
unit in discrete-time model)
It Number of infected hosts at time t∆
β Pairwise rate of infection
α Infection rate per infected host, α = βN
Ct Cumulative number of infected hosts
monitored by time t∆
Zt Monitored worm scan rate at time t∆
η Average scan rate per infected host
p Probability a worm scan is monitored
R Variance of observation error of Ct
νt, ν
′
t, ν
′′
t Observation noise in worm models
τt Weight in Kalman filter formula
yt Measurement data in Kalman filter
wt White noise in measurement yt at time t∆
δ Constant in equation yt = δIt + wt
MWC Abbr. of “Malware Warning Center”
αˆ Estimated value of α
Aτ Transpose of a matrix A
N(µ, σ2) Normal distribution with mean µ
and variance σ2
which has the solution
It = I0e
βNt (3)
In this paper, we use discrete-time model for
worm modelling and early detection. Time is di-
vided into intervals of length ∆, where ∆ is the
discrete time unit. To simplify the notations, we
use “t” as the discrete time index from now on.
For example, It means the number of infected hosts
at time t∆. The discrete-time version of the simple
epidemic model (1) can be written as [7]:
It = (1 + α∆)It−1 − β∆I2t−1 (4)
where
α = βN (5)
We call α as infection rate because it is the average
number of vulnerable hosts that can be infected per
unit time by one infected host during the early stage
of a worm’s propagation.
For the exponential worm model (2), we derive
an autoregressive (AR) discrete-time model similar
to (4):
It = (1 + α∆)It−1 (6)
which is called AR exponential model in this paper.
We can also derive another discrete-time model by
taking logarithm on both sides of the solution (3):
lnIt = t∆α + lnI0 (7)
which is called transformed linear model in this
paper.
Before we go on to discuss how to use the worm
models to detect and predict worm propagation, we
first present the monitoring system design in the
next Section IV and discuss data collection issues
in Section V.
IV. MONITORING SYSTEM
In this section, we propose the architecture of a
worm monitoring system. The monitoring system
aims to provide comprehensive observation data on
a worm’s activities for the early detection of the
worm. The monitoring system consists of a Malware
Warning Center (MWC) and distributed monitors as
shown in Fig. 2.
A. Monitoring System Architecture
Fig. 2. A generic worm monitoring system
There are two kinds of monitors: ingress scan
monitors and egress scan monitors. Ingress scan
monitors are located on gateways or border routers
of local networks. They can be the ingress filters on
border routers of the local networks, or separated
passive network monitors. The goal of an ingress
scan monitor is to monitor scan traffic coming into a
local network by logging incoming traffic to unused
local IP addresses. For management reason, Local
network administrators know how addresses inside
their networks are allocated; it is relatively easy for
them to set up the ingress scan monitor on routers in
their local networks. For example, during the Code
Red incident on July 19th, 2002, a /8 network at
UCSD and two /16 networks at Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory were used to collect Code Red scan
5traffic. All port 80 TCP SYN packets coming in
to nonexistent IP addresses in these networks were
considered to be Code Red scans [17].
An egress scan monitor is located at the egress
point of a local network. It can be set up as a
part of the egress filter on the routers of a local
network. The goal of an egress scan monitor is
to monitor the outgoing traffic from a network to
infer a potential worm’s scan behavior. Ingress scan
monitors listen to the global traffic in the Internet;
they are the sensors of the global worm incidents
(or called “network telescope” in [20]). However,
it is difficult to determine the behavior of each
individual worm from the data collected by ingress
scan monitors since such monitors cannot capture
most of the scans sent out by an infected host.
On the other hand, if a computer inside a local
network is infected, the egress scan monitor on this
network’s routers can observe most of the scans sent
out by the compromised computer. The closer the
egress scan monitor is to an infected computer, the
more accurate information could be referred about
the worm’s scan behavior.
For worm early warning at real-time, distributed
monitors are required to send observation data to the
MWC continuously without significant delay, even
when the worm scan traffic has caused congestion
to the Internet. For this reason, a tree-like hierarchy
of data mixers can be set up between monitors and
MWC: MWC is the root; the leaves of the tree are
monitors. The monitors nearby a data mixer send
observed data to the data mixer. After fusing the
data together, the data mixer passes the data to a
higher level data mixer or directly to MWC. An ex-
ample of data fusion is the removal of repetitive IP
addresses from the list of infected hosts. However,
the tree structure of data mixers creates single points
of failure, thus there is a trade-off in designing this
hierarchical structure.
B. Location for Distributed Monitors
Ingress scan monitors on a local network may
need to be put on several routers instead of only on
the border router — the border router may not know
the usage of all IP addresses of this local network.
In addition, since worms might choose different
destination addresses by using different preferences,
we need to use distributed address spaces with
different sizes and characteristics to ensure proper
coverage. Later on, we show that for monitoring
non-uniform scan worms such as Blaster, the IP
space covered by a monitoring system should be
as distributed as possible.
For egress scan monitors, worms on different
infected computers will exhibit different behaviors.
For example, Slammer’s scan rate is constrained by
an infected computer’s bandwidth [19]. Therefore,
we need to set up distributed egress filters to record
the scan behaviors of many infected hosts at differ-
ent locations and in different network environments.
In this way, the monitoring system could obtain a
comprehensive view of the behaviors of a worm.
V. DATA COLLECTION AND BIAS CORRECTION
After setting up a monitoring system, we need to
determine what kind of data should be collected.
The main task for an egress scan monitor is to
determine the behaviors of a worm, such as the
worm’s average scan rate and scan distribution.
Denote η as the average worm scan rate, which is
the average number of scans sent out by an infected
host in a unit time. Thus in a monitoring interval ∆,
an infected host sends out on average η∆ scans.
The ingress scan monitors record two types of
data: the number of scans they receive during the
t-th monitoring interval, t = 1, 2, · · · and the IP
addresses of infected hosts that have sent scans to
the monitors by time t∆.
If all monitors send observation data to MWC
once in every monitoring interval, then MWC ob-
tains the following observation data at each discrete
time epoch t, t = 1, 2, · · · :
(1). A worm’s scan distribution, e.g., uniform
scan or scan with address preference,
(2). A worm’s average scan rate η,
(3). The number of scans monitored in a moni-
toring interval from time (t − 1)∆ to t∆, denoted
by Zt,
(4). The cumulative number of infected hosts
observed by time t∆, denoted by Ct.
In this paper, we primarily focus on worms
that uniformly scan the Internet. Let p denote the
probability that a worm scan is monitored by a
monitoring system. If ingress scan monitors cover m
IP addresses, then a worm scan has the probability
p = m/232 to hit the monitoring system. We assume
that in the discrete-time model all changes happen
right before the discrete time epoch t, then we have
6E[Zt] = η∆pIt−1 (8)
A. Correction of Biased Observation Ct
For a uniform scan worm, each worm scan has
a small probability p of being observed by a moni-
toring system, thus an infected host will send out
many scans before one of them is observed by
ingress scan monitors, which follows a Bernoulli
trial with a small success probability p. Therefore,
the number of infected hosts monitored by time
t∆, Ct, is not proportional to It. This bias has
been mentioned in [6] and [20], but neither of them
have presented methods to correct the bias. In the
following, we present an effective way to obtain an
accurate estimate for the number of infected hosts
It based on Ct and η.
In real world, different infected hosts of a worm
have different scan rates. To derive the bias cor-
rection formula, let us first assume that all infected
hosts have the same scan rate η (we will show the
effect of removing this assumption in the following
simulation). In a monitoring interval ∆, a worm
sends out η∆ scans on average, thus the monitoring
system has the probability 1− (1−p)η∆ to detect at
least one scan from an infected host in a monitoring
interval.
At time (t − 1)∆, the monitoring system has
observed Ct−1 infected hosts among the overall
infected ones It−1. During the next monitoring in-
terval from (t− 1)∆ to t∆, every host of those not
yet observed ones, It−1 − Ct−1, has the probability
1−(1−p)η∆ to be observed. Suppose in the discrete-
time model, all changes happen right before the
discrete time epoch t, then the average number of
infected hosts monitored by time t∆ conditioned on
Ct−1 is
E[Ct|Ct−1] = Ct−1 + (It−1 − Ct−1)[1− (1− p)η∆]
(9)
Removing the conditioning on Ct−1 yields
E[Ct] = E[Ct−1] + (It−1 −E[Ct−1])[1− (1− p)η∆]
(10)
From it we can derive the formula for It as:
It =
E[Ct+1]− (1− p)η∆E[Ct]
1− (1− p)η∆ (11)
Since E[Ct] is unknown in one incident of a
worm’s propagation, we replace E[Ct] by Ct and
derive the estimate of It as
Iˆt =
Ct+1 − (1− p)η∆Ct
1− (1− p)η∆ (12)
Now we analyze how the statistical observation
error of Ct affects the estimated value of It. Without
considering non-worm noise, suppose the observa-
tion data Ct is
Ct = E[Ct] + wt (13)
where the statistical observation error wt is a white
noise with variance R. Substituting (13) into (12)
yields
Iˆt = It + µt (14)
where the error µt is
µt =
wt+1 − (1− p)η∆wt
1− (1− p)η∆ (15)
Since E[µt] = 0, the estimated value Iˆt is un-
biased (under the assumption that all infected hosts
have the same scan rate η). The variance of the error
of Iˆt is
V ar[µt] = E[µ
2
t ] =
1 + (1− p)2η∆
[1− (1− p)η∆]2R (16)
The equation above shows that V ar[µt] is always
larger than R, which means the statistical error of
observation Ct is amplified by the bias correction
formula (12). If ingress scan monitors cover smaller
size of IP space, p would decrease, then (16) shows
that the estimate Iˆt would become noisier.
We simulate Code Red propagation to check the
accuracy of the bias correction formula (12). In the
simulation, N = 360, 000; the monitoring interval
∆ is one minute; the average worm scan rate is
η = 358 per minute.. The monitoring system covers
217 IP addresses (equal to two Class B networks).
Because different infected hosts have different scan
rates, we assume each infected host has a scan rate
x that is predetermined by the normal distribution
N(η, σ2) where σ = 100 in the simulation (x is
bounded by x ≥ 1. We will explain how we choose
these parameters in Section VII). The simulation
result is shown in Fig. 3.
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(Monitoring 214 IP space)
Fig. 3 shows that the observed number of infected
hosts, Ct, deviates substantially from the real value
It. After the bias correction by using (12), the
estimated Iˆt matches It well in the simulation before
the worm enters the slow finish phase ( Iˆt deviates
a little from It in the slow finish phase). In deriving
the bias correction formula (12), we have assumed
that all hosts have the same scan rate η, which is
not the case in this simulation. In this simulation,
some hosts have very small scan rate; these hosts
will take much longer time to hit the monitoring
system than others. Thus in the slow finish phase,
many unobserved infected hosts are the ones with
very low scan rate. Therefore, during the slow finish
phase, the bias correction formula has some error
due to the decreasing of the average scan rate for
those unobserved infected hosts. In fact, we have
run many other simulations by letting all hosts to
have the same scan rate η (i.e., let σ = 0); then the
Iˆt after bias correction always matches well with It
without bias.
Fig. 4 shows the simulation results if the mon-
itoring system only covers 214 IP addresses. The
estimate Iˆt after the bias correction is still accurate
but noisier because of the error amplification effect
described by (16).
VI. EARLY DETECTION AND ESTIMATION OF
WORM VIRULENCE
In this section, we propose estimation meth-
ods based on recursive filtering algorithms (e.g.,
Kalman filters [1],) for stochastic dynamic systems.
At MWC, we recursively estimate the parameter
α based on observation data at each monitoring
interval in order to detect a worm at its early stage.
Let y1, y2, · · · , yt, be the measurement data used
by a Kalman filter estimation algorithm. Suppose
the observations have one monitoring interval delay:
yt = δIt−1 + wt (17)
where wt is the observation error. δ is a constant
ratio: if we use Zt as yt, then δ = η∆p as shown
in (8); if we use Iˆt−1 derived from Ct by the bias
correction (12), then δ = 1.
A. Early Detection Based on Kalman Filter Estima-
tion
In Section III, we have presented three discrete-
time worm models: the epidemic model (4), the AR
exponential model (6), and the transformed linear
model (7). In this section, we present three Kalman
filter estimation algorithms, one for each discrete-
time model.
From (17), we have
It−1 = yt/δ − wt/δ (18)
First, we use the simple epidemic model (4).
Substituting (18) into the worm model (4) yields
an equation describing the relationship between yt
and a worm’s parameters α and β:
yt = (1 + α∆)yt−1 − β∆
δ
y2t−1 + νt (19)
where the noise νt is
νt = wt − (1 + α)wt−1 − β∆(w2t−1 − 2yt−1wt−1)/δ
(20)
A recursive least square algorithm for α and β
can be cast into a standard Kalman filter format
[1][16]. Let αˆt and βˆt denote the estimated value
8of α and β at time t∆, respectively. Define the
system state as Xt =
[
1 + ∆α
−β∆/δ
]
. If we denote
Ht = [ yt−1 y2t−1 ], then the system is described
by {
Xt = Xt−1
yt = HtXt + νt
(21)
The Kalman filter in estimating Xt is

Ht = [ yt−1 y2t−1 ]
Kt = Pt−1Hτt /(HtPt−1H
τ
t + 1/τt)
Pt = (I −KtHt)Pt−1
Xˆt = Xˆt−1 + Kt(yt −HtXˆt−1)
(22)
where τt is the weight of the t-th error term in the
Least Square (LS) estimation algorithm [16]. We
can use it to adjust whether our estimation should
rely more on recent monitored data (τt increases as
t increases) or equally on all monitored data (τt is
a constant).
νt in (20) is a correlated noise. The Kalman filter
(22) can be extended to consider such correlated
noise to derive unbiased estimates of α and β in
theory (such as an extended Kalman filter [1]).
However, an unbiased Kalman filter introduces ad-
ditional parameters to estimate, thus the new filter
will converge slower than the proposed filter (22).
In fact, we have designed an extended Kalman filter
and our experiments confirm this conjecture. In this
paper the primary objective is to derive a rough
estimate of α as quickly as possible for early worm
detection. Therefore, it is better to use the simple
Kalman filter (22) for early worm detection.
If we use Zt as the measurement data yt in
the Kalman filter but do not know δ (e.g., if we
do not have data from egress scan monitors), we
still can estimate the infection rate α by letting
δ = 1. The Kalman filter (22) does not depend on
δ in estimating α; the value of δ only affects the
estimated value of β.
Now we consider the AR exponential model (6).
Substituting (18) into model (6) yields:
yt = (1 + ∆α)yt−1 + ν ′t (23)
where the noise ν ′t is
ν ′t = wt − (1 + ∆α)wt−1 (24)
Equation (23) has the similar format as (19). Thus
if we change Xt and Ht in the original Kalman filter
(22) to Xt = [1+∆α] and Ht = [yt−1], we derive a
new Kalman filter for early worm detection that is
based on the AR exponential model (6).
For the transformed linear model (7), we can
derive the formula of yt as:
ln(yt − wt) = (t− 1)∆α + lnI0 (25)
In early worm detection, it’s difficult or impossi-
ble for us to know when a worm starts spreading,
i.e., we do not know the absolute value t. We only
know a relative time t− t0 where t0 > 0 is the time
when we activate our Kalman filter detection system
— the true value of t0 is not known. It means that
in worm model we can only use variable t− t0 but
not t. If we let ln(yt−wt) = ln(yt)−ν ′′t , from (25)
we can derive the relationship between yt and the
worm’s infection rate α as
ln(yt) = (t− t0)∆α + K + ν ′′t (26)
where
K = (t0 − 1)∆α + lnδ + lnI0 (27)
and the noise ν ′′t is
ν ′′t = ln(yt)− ln(yt − wt) (28)
When we activate the Kalman filter in our early
detection system, yt > 1 and yt − wt > 1 always
hold. From (28) we know that sign(ν ′′t ) = sign(wt)
and |ν ′′t | < |wt| because the logarithm function y =
ln(x) always increases slower than the function y =
x when x increases in the domain x ∈ (1,∞). In
addition, from (28) we also know that
d|ν ′′t |
dyt
= − |wt|
yt(yt − wt) < 0 (29)
Therefore, the noise ν ′′t in (26) decreases its mag-
nitude when yt increases as time goes on.
When we use the transformed linear model (7)
for early worm detection, the system state vector
for the Kalman filter is Xt =
[
∆α
K
]
. Now Ht =
[ t− t0 1 ] and the system is described by{
Xt = Xt−1
ln(yt) = HtXt + ν
′′
t
(30)
The Kalman filter in estimating Xt is

Ht = [ t− t0 1 ]
Kt = Pt−1Hτt /(HtPt−1H
τ
t + 1/τt)
Pt = (I −KtHt)Pt−1
Xˆt = Xˆt−1 + Kt[ln(yt)−HtXˆt−1]
(31)
9B. Estimation of Vulnerable Population Size
For a uniform scan worm, we present an effective
way to predict the population size N based on the
observation data η and the estimate α from the
Kalman filters above. In this way, we can know
how many computers are vulnerable in the Internet
when a worm is still in its slow start phase. A
uniform scan worm sends out on average η scans
per unit time; each scan has the probability N/232
to hit a host in the population under consideration.
Hence, at the beginning when most hosts in the
vulnerable population N are still vulnerable, a worm
can infect on average ηN/232 hosts per unit time
(the probability of two scans sent out by a single
infected host hitting the same target is negligible).
From the definition of infection rate α, we have
α = ηN/232. Therefore, the population N is
N =
232α
η
(32)
where the average worm scan rate η can be obtained
directly from egress scan monitors in the monitoring
system. When we use one of the Kalman filters
above to estimate α, we can use (32) to estimate
N along with the Kalman filter estimation. In this
way, the estimation of N has similar convergence
properties to the estimation of α from the Kalman
filter.
C. Overview of the Steps to Detect a Worm
MWC collects and aggregates reports of worm
scans from all distributed monitors once in every
monitoring interval in real-time. For each TCP
or UDP port, MWC has an alarm threshold for
monitored illegitimate scan traffic Zt. The observed
number of scans Zt, which contains non-worm
noise, is below this threshold in most time when
there is no global spreading worm. If the monitored
scan traffic is over the alarm threshold for several
consecutive monitoring intervals, e.g., Zt is over the
threshold for three consecutive times, the Kalman
filter will be activated. Then MWC begins to record
Ct and calculates the average worm scan rate η from
the reports of egress scan monitors. Because Ct is
a cumulative observation data that could cumulate
all non-worm noise, MWC begins to record data Ct
only after the Kalman filter is activated. The Kalman
filter can either use Ct or Zt to estimate all the
parameters of a worm at time t∆ (t = 1, 2, 3, · · · ).
The recursive estimation will continue until the
estimated value of α shows a trend: if the estimate
αˆ stabilizes and oscillates slightly around a positive
constant value, we have detected the presence of a
worm; if the estimate αˆ oscillates around zero, we
believe the surge of illegitimate monitored traffic is
caused by non-worm noise.
VII. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
A. Simulation Settings
We have simulated Code Red [9], SQL Slammer
[19], and Blaster [10]. First, we explain how we
choose the simulation parameters. In the case of
Code Red, more than 359, 000 Code Red infected
hosts were observed on July 19th, 2001 by CAIDA
[17]. Thus in our simulation we set the Code Red
vulnerable population N = 360, 000. Staniford et al.
[23] used a different format but the same epidemic
model as (1) to model Code Red, where their
model’s parameter K has K = βN = α [29]. They
determined that K = 1.8 for the time scale of one
hour. Therefore, for the discrete time unit of one
minute in our simulation, α = 1.8/60 = 0.03. From
(32) we can reversely derive η = 232α/N = 358 per
minute, i.e., Code Red sends out on average about
358 scans per minute per infected host.
Because different infected hosts have different
scan rates, we assume that each infected host has
a constant scan rate x, a rate that is independently
predetermined by a normal distribution N(η, σ2)
where σ = 100 (the scan rate x is bounded by
x ≥ 1). In our simulation, ingress scan monitors
cover 220 IP space. We also assume I0 = 10 at the
beginning.
Because of the sequential scan used by Blaster,
until now people have not got an accurate estimation
of how many computers were really infected by this
worm when it propagated on August 11th 2003 (we
will explain the reason later in our experiments).
Since we want to understand how the sequential
scan affects a worm’s propagation and our early de-
tection system, in this paper we assume that Blaster
has the same parameters as Code Red, i.e., N =
360, 000, η = 358 per minute, each worm’s scan rate
x follows normal distribution N(358, 1002) with the
bound x ≥ 1, and I0 = 10 at the beginning.
For a uniform scan worm, such as Code Red
and Slammer, the distribution of vulnerable hosts in
the Internet will not affect the worm’s propagation.
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However, this distribution affects the propagation of
Blaster [32] because of its sequential scan. Since we
do not know the true distribution of vulnerable hosts
in the Internet, in our Blaster worm simulation, we
assume vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed in
the IP space defined by BGP routing prefixes, which
is less than 30% of the entire IPv4 space [31][32].
In the discrete-time simulation, the monitoring
interval ∆ is set to be one minute for Code Red and
Blaster. SQL Slammer propagates much faster and
can finish infection in about 10 minutes [19]. Hence
the monitoring interval should be much shorter in
order to catch the dynamics of this worm. For this
reason, the monitoring interval for Slammer is set
to be one or several seconds.
B. Background Noise Consideration
We need to consider background non-worm noise
in our simulations. Fortunately, Goldsmith [8] pro-
vided simple data of the background noise for Code
Red activities monitored on a Class B network
(covers 216 IP addresses). He recorded TCP port
80 SYN requests from Internet hosts to any unused
IP addresses inside his local network — such data
are exactly the monitored data collected by ingress
scan monitors in our proposed monitoring system.
His monitored data showed that the background
noise was small compared to Code Red traffic and
the noise did not vary much. If we use normal
distribution to model the background noise, then
for each hour the number of noise scans follows
N(110.5, 302) and the number of source hosts that
send noise follows N(17.4, 3.32).
We try to hold the statistics of the observed
background noise in our experiments: we monitor
220 IP space, which is 16 times as large as what
Goldsmith monitored, so the number of noise scans
or noise sources should be enlarged by 16 times;
we use one minute in stead of one hour as the
monitoring interval, thus we should decrease the
number of noise scans or noise sources by 60. In
this way, in our Code Red and Blaster simulations,
the noise added into the observation data at each
monitoring interval follows N(29.5, 82) for Zt and
N(4.63, 0.8932) for Ct. Of course, this kind of
extension of noise is very rough, but it is the best
we can do based on the data available. Currently, we
are trying to obtain detailed log data on previously
appeared worms from other researchers in order to
have more realistic experiments.
In the simulation experiments, the alarm thresh-
old for Zt is set to be two times as large as the
mean value of the background noise, i.e., the alarm
threshold is 29.5 × 2 = 59. The Kalman filter
we use in early detection will be activated when
the monitored scan traffic Zt is over the alarm
threshold for three consecutive monitoring intervals.
In this way, the Kalman filter will not be frequently
activated by the surge of background noise traffic in
the normal days.
C. Code Red Simulation and Early Detection
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Fig. 5. Code Red propagation and its variability (100 simulation
runs)
We simulate Code Red propagation for 100 sim-
ulation runs. Fig. 5 shows the number of infected
hosts as a function of time for three cases: the
average value, the 95th percentile, and the 5th
percentile. The curve of 95th percentile means that
in 95 out of our 100 simulation runs, Code Red
propagates no faster than what this curve represents.
This figure shows that a worm propagates slightly
differently in different sample runs. The propagation
speed difference is mainly caused by a worm’s
spreading at the beginning when only several in-
fected hosts scan and attempt to infect others. In
fact, we have chosen I0 = 1 and run Code Red
propagation for another 100 simulation runs. It
shows that Code Red in the I0 = 1 case propagates
more variously than the one shown in Fig. 5 where
I0 = 10.
For one Code Red propagation simulation run,
Fig. 6 shows the estimation of the worm infection
rate α as a function of time by using three Kalman
filters based on three discrete-time models: epidemic
model (4), AR exponential model (6), and trans-
formed linear model (7), respectively. This figure
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a. Based on epidemic model (4)
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Fig. 6. Kalman filter estimation of Code Red infection rate α (for one simulation run)
shows the estimates by using the monitored data Zt.
We can use either the monitored data Zt or the data
Ct after bias correction (12) to estimate α for Code
Red — they provide the similar estimation results
[30]. Later on when we study the early detection of
Blaster, because of its non-uniform scan, we cannot
use the bias correction (12) for the monitored data
Ct anymore and have to rely on the monitored data
Zt in our early detection. Therefore, in this paper
we will only discuss early worm detection by using
the monitored data Zt.
In this simulation run, Zt at time 126, 127, and
128 minutes are over the alarm threshold 59, thus
the Kalman filter is activated at time 128 minutes.
Fig. 6 shows that the Kalman filter estimation based
on the transformed linear model provides much
better estimation result than the other two. This is
because the noise ν ′′t introduced by the transformed
linear model (7) is smaller than the noise νt and ν ′t
introduced by the other two models.
The noise νt, ν ′t and ν ′′t introduced by these
three models are shown in (20), (24), and (28),
respectively. We can see that the magnitude of the
noise ν ′′t (28) introduced by the transformed linear
model decreases as time goes on as shown in (29).
On the other hand, the magnitude of the noise ν ′t
(24) introduced by the AR exponential model does
not change; the magnitude of the noise νt (20)
introduced by the epidemic model even increases
as time goes on (because yt−1 in (20) increases as
time goes on).
Because of the decreasing noise ν ′′t in the trans-
formed linear model, we select τt = t2 in the
Kalman filter (31) of the transformed linear model
in order to put more weight on the newest less
noisy observation data. On the other hand, we select
τt ≡ 1 for both the Kalman filters of the epidemic
model and the AR exponential model.
In the Code Red simulation run shown in Fig.
6, the worm infects 0.5% of vulnerable computers
in the Internet at time 174 minutes. If we use the
transformed linear model in our early detection,
Fig. 6(c) shows that the estimate αˆ has already
stabilized at a positive, constant value by that time.
Therefore, we can detect the presence of Code Red
when it has only infected 0.5% of all vulnerable
population in the Internet. We have done such
early detection by using Kalman filters for many
simulation runs and have achieved the similar early
detection performance. In our previous paper [30],
we have shown that the early detection system can
achieve the similar detection performance — detect
a worm when it infects a similar small percentage
of vulnerable population — no matter whether this
worm propagates faster or slower in different sim-
ulation runs.
Note that the estimate αˆ shown in Fig. 6, espe-
cially the estimate in Fig. 6(c), is smaller than its
true value. This bias is not caused by Kalman filters
or worm models, but caused by the non-negative
background noise in the monitored data Zt. Fig.
7 shows the infected hosts It compared with the
monitored data Zt during the slow start phase of
Code Red propagation in the logarithm format (after
scaling Zt to have the similar value scale as It).
This figure clearly shows that Code Red propagates
exponentially at the beginning — the exponential
growth rate is in fact the worm infection rate α
estimated by our Kalman filters. From this figure,
we see that the exponential growth rate of Zt (the
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the infected hosts It with the monitored data
Zt at the beginning of Code Red propagation (log-format on Y-axis)
data we use in Kalman filter estimation) is slightly
smaller than the real exponential growth rate of It.
Therefore, the estimate in Fig. 6(c) is smaller than
its true value α. This estimation bias, however, does
not matter much because our primary objective is to
detect the presence of a worm, not to get an accurate
estimation of the worm’s infection rate.
We predict the vulnerable population size N from
(32) at each discrete time when we update the
estimate of α from Kalman filters. Fig. 8 shows the
estimated value of N as a function of time based
on the Kalman filter of transformed linear model
(31) and the Kalman filter of epidemic model (22),
respectively. The estimated Nˆ from transformed lin-
ear model is smaller than the real value N because
of the bias of αˆ shown in Fig. 6(c). In a real
implementation, we should combine both estimation
curves shown in Fig. 8 to predict the vulnerable
population size N .
128 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 2900
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 105
Time t (minute)
Es
tim
at
ed
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
N
Real population size N
Transformed linear model
Simple epidemic model
Fig. 8. Estimate of the vulnerable population size N for Code Red
Because Slammer propagates in the same way as
Code Red by uniformly scanning the Internet, its
propagation and its early detection are very similar
to what Code Red has [30]. Therefore, we do not
repeatedly show the early detection of Slammer in
this paper.
D. Blaster Simulation and Early Detection
Each Blaster infected host scans the entire IP
space sequentially from a selected starting point. To
select this starting IP address, each worm copy has
a 40% probability to choose the first address of its
“Class C”-size subnet (x.x.x.0), and a 60% prob-
ability to choose a completely random IP address
[10].
Because of Blaster’s sequential scan mechanism,
the distribution of vulnerable hosts in the IPv4 space
affects the worm’s propagation behavior. Since we
do not know the real distribution of vulnerable
hosts in the Internet, we use BGP routing tables
and assume that vulnerable hosts are uniformly
distributed in the BGP routable space, which is less
than 30% of the entire IPv4 space [31].
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Fig. 9. Worm propagation comparison between Code Red and
Blaster (100 simulation runs)
Since we select the same parameters for both
Code Red and Blaster simulations, we can compare
them to study how the sequential scan affects a
worm’s propagation. Again, we run Blaster propaga-
tion for 100 simulation runs. Fig. 9 shows the 95th
percentile and 5th percentile of Blaster’s propaga-
tion compared with the previous Code Red simula-
tions shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 9 shows that Blaster still
propagates according to the simple epidemic model
(1), and thus the worm can be modelled by the three
discrete-time models presented in this paper. This
figure also shows that Blaster propagates slower
than Code Red. Zou et al. [32] point out that this
is because Blaster selects its starting scanning point
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c. Monitored data Zt after using a
low-pass filter
Fig. 10. Blaster propagation and its monitored data
with a local preference, not because of its sequential
scan mechanism.
For monitoring of Blaster, because of the se-
quential scan, we cannot let the monitoring system
to only cover one big block IP address space —
such a monitoring system can only observe a very
small fraction of infected hosts in the Internet. For
example, if a sequential scan worm has the same fast
scan rate η = 4000 per second as Slammer [19], one
infected host will take 232/η = 12.4 days to finish
scanning the entire IPv4 space. Therefore, most
hosts infected by Blaster will take days before their
scans hit the big block IP address space monitored
in a monitoring system.
For this reason, a good worm monitoring system
should cover as distributed as possible IP address
space in the Internet. In this paper, we simulate
two monitoring systems. Both monitoring systems
cover the same 220 IP addresses (the same as the
monitoring system in previous Code Red study),
but they consist of different number of monitored IP
blocks: one monitors 16 Class B networks; the other
monitors 1024 equal-size blocks of IP space of size
210. All monitored address blocks in a monitoring
system are evenly distributed in the entire IPv4
space.
Fig. 10 shows one simulation run of Blaster. Fig.
10(a) shows the number of infected hosts I(t) in the
Internet as a function of time t. It also shows the
cumulative number of observed infected hosts, C(t),
from both monitoring systems. Because observed
C(t) is very small compared with I(t), we plot this
figure by taking logarithm on Y-axis.
Fig. 10(a) shows that we can observe less than
0.1% of infected hosts in the Internet from the 16-
block monitoring system during the worm’s propa-
gation period. Even if we use the 1024-block mon-
itoring system, we can only observe less than 4%
of infected hosts in the Internet during the worm’s
propagation period. This is the reason why until now
researchers have not derived an accurate estimate of
how many computers were really infected by Blaster
during the first several days of its break out.
Fig. 10(b) shows the monitored data Z(t), the
number of worm scans observed within each minute.
Compared to the 16-block monitoring system, The
1024-block monitoring system gives noisier ob-
servation Z(t). This is because as time goes on,
an infected host will enter or leave one of the
monitored IP blocks — it happens more frequently
in the 1024-block monitoring system than in the 16-
block monitoring system.
Although noisier than the data from the 16-
block monitoring system, the monitored data from
the 1024-block monitoring system represent more
accurately the propagation of a sequential scan
worm. From the monitored data sets, we want to
know the worm propagation pattern in the global
Internet, i.e., the curve of It shown in Fig. 10(b).
Such growth pattern of It is a low frequency signal
compared with the high frequency noise presented
in the observed data Zt. Therefore, we can use a
low-pass filter to filter out high frequency noise
from Zt without changing the worm’s propagation
pattern. Fig. 10(c) shows the observation data Zt
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after filtered by a first-order low-pass filter 1. This
figure clearly shows that the monitored data from
the 1024-block monitoring system can represent
well the worm’s propagation pattern in the entire
Internet.
Based on the filtered monitored data Zt from
the 1024-block monitoring system as shown in Fig.
10(c), we run the Kalman filter estimation by using
the transformed linear model. The estimated αˆ is
shown in Fig. 11 as a function of time 2. In this
simulation run, Blaster infects 1.3% of vulnerable
population at time 240 minutes, by which time
the estimate αˆ has already stabilized and oscillated
slightly around a positive, constant value. Hence
our early detection system can detect Blaster before
it infects 1.3% of vulnerable population in the
Internet.
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Fig. 11. Kalman filter estimation of worm infection rate α for Blaster
(based on the transformed linear model and filtered data Zt from a
1024-block monitoring system)
Worm propagation in other Blaster simulation
runs give similar results as what shown in Fig. 10
and Fig. 11. On occasion the 16-block monitoring
system provides as good observation as the 1024-
block monitoring system. However, the 1024-block
monitoring system always provides stable and good
observations while the 16-block monitoring system
provides poor observations in many instances.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We have used the simple epidemic model (1) and
the exponential model (2) for the estimation and
1Denote by Zˆt as the Zt after filtering. The low-pass filter is Zˆt =
aZt + (1− a)Zˆt−1. We use a = 0.1 in Fig. 10(c).
2Because the filtered data Zt in Blaster scenario are noisier than
the Zt in Code Red scenario, here we choose τt = t in the Kalman
filter (31) instead of the τt = t2 in the previous Code Red early
detection.
prediction. While these models give good results
so far, we need to develop more detailed models
to reflect a future worm’s dynamics. For example,
if a worm spreads through a topology, or spreads
by exploiting multiple vulnerabilities, or is a meta-
server worm, then its propagation may not follow
the models used in this paper.
The monitoring interval ∆ is an important pa-
rameter in the system design. For a slow spreading
worm, it could be set to be long, but for a fast
spreading worm such as Slammer, the time interval
should be quite small in order to catch up with the
worm’s dynamics. How can we select the appropri-
ated ∆ before we know a worm’s presence and its
speed? We need to do further research on designing
a recursive estimation algorithm that uses adaptive
sampling rate. Currently, one way we think of is to
tag the time stamp with each observed scans. Then
at MWC, several estimators run in parallel with
different monitoring intervals — from the tagged
time stamp the correct Ct or Zt for every estimators
can easily be restored.
It could be useful to develop distributed estima-
tion algorithms so as to reduce the latency and traffic
for the report to a central server. We may also want
to use a continuous version of the Kalman filter.
This approach would reduce the significance of the
monitoring interval selection and would work nicely
with the distributed estimation setting.
The worm detection method presented here as-
sumes that only worm scans can cause exponentially
increased traffic to monitors, while other back-
ground scan noise cannot. We believe this is a rea-
sonable assumption. If we want to further improve
the detection accuracy, however, we can add some
other rule sets in the detection system. For example,
in order to distinguish a worm attack from a DDoS
attack, we can exploit the differences between them:
DDoS attack has one or several targets while a
worm’s propagation has no specific target.
The infrastructure of the monitoring system in
this paper is already built up in the real world,
such as the SANS’s “Internet Storm Center” [15] or
Symantec’s enterprise early warning network [25].
However, there are still significant practical issues
in setting up such a monitoring system, especially
the security and privacy issues in data sharing.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a monitoring and early detection
system for Internet worms to provide an accurate
triggering signal for mitigation mechanisms in the
early stage of a future worm. Such a system is
needed in view of the propagation scale and the
speed of the past worms. Although we have been
lucky that the previous worms have not been very
malicious, the same can not be said for the future
worms. Based on the idea “detecting the trend, not
the burst” of monitored illegitimate scan traffic,
we present a non-threshold based “trend detection”
methodology to detect the presence of a worm in
its early stage by using Kalman filter and worm
propagation models. Our analysis and simulation
studies indicate that such a system is feasible, and
the “trend detection” methodology poses many in-
teresting research issues. We hope this paper would
generate interests of discussion and participation
in this topic and eventually lead to an effective
monitoring and early detection system.
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